Editor’s Note: This article was originally published by Reinvantage. It is republished here with the author's permission.
BAKU, Azerbaijan, January 8. Not long ago, Azerbaijan was widely treated as a geopolitical margin—important mainly for its oil and gas, constrained by unresolved conflict, and largely reactive to the agendas of larger powers. Today, that perception is increasingly outdated. From the Caspian Sea to Central Asia and from the South Caucasus to Europe, Azerbaijan has emerged as a state that not only adapts to regional change but actively shapes it.
This shift did not happen by accident. It reflects a convergence of post-conflict transformation, infrastructure-driven diplomacy, and a foreign policy that prioritises strategic autonomy over bloc politics. Under President Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan has turned geography into leverage, positioning itself as a connector of regions, energy systems, and political interests at a moment when global connectivity itself is being redefined.
The idea that Azerbaijan could one day play such a role is not entirely new. In the mid-1990s, when the country was still struggling with instability and unresolved war, the late US strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that Azerbaijan possessed the core attributes of a successful, independent state—provided it could consolidate sovereignty and anchor itself economically.
When I interviewed Brzezinski in 1996 for my book The South Caucasus at the Crossroads, and later spoke with him again at the Jamestown Foundation in 2010, he consistently described Azerbaijan as a geopolitical hinge: a country whose success or failure would shape the wider Caspian and South Caucasus balance. Three decades later, that assessment appears less theoretical than empirical.
From conflict resolution to strategic reconstruction
The restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in 2023 marked a decisive turning point. Yet what followed may prove just as consequential. Rather than freezing the post-conflict status quo, Baku moved quickly to integrate the formerly Armenian-occupied territories into national and regional development plans. Airports, highways, rail links, power infrastructure, and new urban projects have been launched at a pace rarely seen in post-conflict environments.
This reconstruction effort is not merely about rebuilding what was destroyed. It is about repositioning Karabakh within Azerbaijan’s long-term economic strategy—linking it to logistics corridors, renewable-energy projects, and digital infrastructure. By emphasising smart cities and green-energy zones, the government has sought to align post-war recovery with future growth rather than past dependency.
For external partners, the message is clear: Azerbaijan is not only capable of restoring territories to full control, but also of governing and developing them. That capacity matters in a region long defined by frozen conflicts and stalled transitions.
The Middle Corridor and the new geometry of Eurasia
Azerbaijan’s growing influence is most visible in the realm of connectivity. As tensions disrupt traditional East–West trade routes, the Middle Corridor—linking China and Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus—has gained strategic importance. Azerbaijan sits at its operational core.
Through sustained investment in the Port of Alat, rail modernisation, Caspian shipping, and customs coordination, Baku has transformed itself from a transit country into a logistics hub. This has elevated Azerbaijan’s relevance not only for the European Union and Türkiye, but also for Central Asian states seeking diversified access to global markets.
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan increasingly see Azerbaijan as their principal western gateway. Joint transport initiatives, energy cooperation, and coordinated infrastructure planning have created what amounts to a functional connectivity bloc across the Caspian. While not formalised as a political union, this network has tangible geopolitical effects: it reduces dependence on single routes, increases regional bargaining power, and places Azerbaijan at the centre of a widening Eurasian exchange.
Energy diplomacy beyond dependence
Energy remains central to Azerbaijan’s international profile, but its meaning has evolved. Gas exports via the Southern Gas Corridor have reinforced Azerbaijan’s role in European energy security at a time of acute uncertainty. At the same time, Baku has invested heavily in offshore wind, solar power, and future green-energy transmission projects.
This dual approach—meeting immediate demand while preparing for long-term transition—has strengthened Azerbaijan’s credibility as a strategic partner rather than a purely extractive supplier. It also explains the country’s growing visibility on global platforms, including high-level engagement at the United Nations and the hosting of major international forums. Such recognition reflects not only energy capacity, but diplomatic reliability.
A foreign policy built on strategic autonomy
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Azerbaijan’s rise has been its foreign policy posture. Rather than anchoring itself to a single bloc, Baku has pursued a strategy rooted in strategic autonomy—maintaining working relationships across geopolitical divides. President Aliyev has engaged with a wide spectrum of leaders, including Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and US President Donald Trump. These interactions illustrate a diplomacy focused on access, autonomy, and pragmatic influence.
This approach has allowed Azerbaijan to retain room for manoeuvre in an increasingly polarised international system. Relations with the European Union are anchored in energy, transport, and regulatory cooperation, while ties with Russia remain pragmatic without compromising independence.
Engagement with Iran has been recalibrated through economic and regional dialogue, and relations with Türkiye and the United States have been consolidated through defence, economic, and diplomatic cooperation. The result is not neutrality, but strategic manoeuvrability across competing spheres of influence.
From potential to power
Taken together, these developments suggest that Azerbaijan has crossed a strategic threshold. It is no longer simply responding to regional dynamics; it is helping define them. The South Caucasus—long shaped by external competition and unresolved disputes—is increasingly organised around initiatives originating in Baku.
These gains, however, are not self-sustaining. Azerbaijan’s emerging role will depend on its ability to manage complexity rather than simply accumulate leverage—balancing connectivity with security, economic integration with sovereignty, and regional ambition with long-term stability. The challenge ahead is less about expansion than consolidation: ensuring that today’s strategic advantages translate into enduring influence.
Still, power in today’s international system is increasingly network-based and transactional. By those measures, Azerbaijan’s performance has been notable. What Brzezinski once identified as potential has begun to materialise as agency: a state using connectivity, reconstruction, and strategic autonomy to shape its environment rather than be shaped by it.
Azerbaijan’s trajectory now poses a strategic question for its partners rather than for Baku itself. Can international actors engage Azerbaijan as a shaping force—one that anchors stability through connectivity and pragmatic diplomacy—rather than viewing it solely through inherited narratives of post-Soviet transition? The answer will influence not only the future of the South Caucasus, but the viability of a more connected Eurasia at a time when fragmentation has become the global norm.