BAKU, Azerbaijan, March 6. The recent military tensions around Iran have disrupted transport routes in the Persian Gulf and surrounding regions. Hostilities have affected maritime shipping and vessel insurance coverage, creating uncertainty for global logistics flows and regional trade.
The conflict has effectively halted the movement of oil tankers through the strategically important Strait of Hormuz and is beginning to impact broader supply chains beyond the energy sector. These disruptions affect not only global supply chains but also the economies of countries closely connected to Iran through trade and transit routes, including Turkmenistan. If hostilities continue, a significant portion of Ashgabat’s foreign trade and economic activity may need to adjust and hedge against risks.
Economic ties between Turkmenistan and Iran have developed actively in recent years, with Iran remaining a notable trading partner for Turkmenistan and an important transit route to southern markets. In 2023, Iran accounted for 12.5% of Turkmenistan’s total imports.
In the first ten months of 2025, the total non-oil trade between the two countries amounted to $555 million and approximately 1.3 million tons of goods. Turkmenistan imports from Iran include agricultural and food products, industrial goods, electrical transformers, water treatment systems, and petrochemical products. Additionally, Iran imports around 2 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually from Turkmenistan.
In recent years, Ashgabat and Tehran have also sought to deepen cooperation in transport and logistics. In 2025, Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, stated that the two countries aim to increase transit volumes to 20 million tons, including 6 million tons intended for rail transport. These plans are linked to broader regional transport initiatives. One of them is the eastern route of the International North-South Transport Corridor, which connects Russia and Central Asian countries to Persian Gulf ports via Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. In 2024, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran agreed on a roadmap for the synchronized development of this route.
Another project is the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman multimodal transport corridor, which is intended to connect Central Asian countries with the Persian Gulf through Iran. In addition, the China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway route is being developed as part of a wider Eurasian transport corridor network.
Iran also plays a key role in providing Central Asian countries access to global maritime markets. The ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar serve as critical gateways connecting the region to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. If disruptions to transport flows through Iran persist for an extended period, implementing such projects may require revising profitability forecasts for trade operations along these routes.
Alternative routes through Pakistan also face uncertainty. In early March, tensions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border escalated after a series of airstrikes, complicating the use of Pakistani ports, including Gwadar, as an alternative outlet for regional trade.
Under these conditions, Turkmenistan, to compensate for potential reductions in existing trade volumes due to regional risks, may seek to strengthen cooperation with partners whose transport links remain stable. One potential direction is the development of trade through the Caspian region. Economic and transit ties with Azerbaijan have been strengthened in recent years through projects associated with the Middle Corridor, which connects Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.
Another key partner remains Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan previously stated that Ankara intends to increase bilateral trade with Turkmenistan from around $2 billion at the current state to $5 billion in the coming years.
Georgia is also a potential candidate. In February 2026, during a visit by the Chairperson of the Turkmenistan Mejlis to Tbilisi, a cooperation agreement was signed between the parliaments of the two countries, and discussions also focused on the development of transport corridors.
In a broader regional context, Turkmenistan may intensify trade relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 2026. As part of its chairmanship of the organization, Ashgabat intends to pay special attention to economic cooperation and transport connectivity, as previously stated by the country’s officials.
At the same time, the country continues to expand cooperation with Europe and Asia. Turkmenistan’s ambassador to Belgium, Sapar Palvanov, has stated that European engagement is one of the key priorities of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy in 2026. Meanwhile, trade between China and Central Asian countries exceeded $100 billion for the first time in 2025, increasing by 12% compared to the previous year.
Although the duration and scale of the current conflict’s consequences remain uncertain, disruptions to transport routes around Iran have already highlighted the vulnerability of regional supply chains, which heavily rely on specific transit routes. For Turkmenistan, located at the center of transcontinental transport networks, these developments could stimulate further diversification of logistics links and trade partnerships. Expanding cooperation in the Caspian region, strengthening economic ties with neighboring countries, and deepening engagement with European and Asian markets could become important factors in maintaining stable trade flows during this period of uncertainty.